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Berger: The Ripeness Game

THE RIPENESS GAME: WHY ARE WE STILL FORCED TO
PLAY?
Michael M. Berger
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is not my first rodeo; I have written about ripeness in
land use takings cases before.1 After all this time and analysis, I am
left with this primal question: WHY? For decades, the reports of the
decisions of federal district and circuit courts have been overflowing
with opinions that laid waste to countless forests so they could discuss the reasons why they were not going to reach the merits of the


Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, and co-chair of the firm’s Appellate Practice Group.
The author has spent the last forty-five years practicing takings law (both direct and inverse).
He has argued four regulatory taking cases in the United States Supreme Court (on the property owners’ side) and has filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the property owners in virtually all of the other significant Supreme Court cases during that period.
1
Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39
(1985); Michael M. Berger, “Ripeness” Test for Land Use Cases Needs Reform: Reconciling
Leading Ninth Circuit Decisions is an Exercise in Futility, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57
(1988); Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes
New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 786-95 (1988); Michael M.
Berger, The Civil Rights Act: An Alternative for Property Owners Which Avoids Some of the
Procedural Traps and Pitfalls in Traditional ‘Takings’ Litigation, 12 ZONING & PLAN. L.
REP. 121 (May 1989); Michael M. Berger & Daniel R. Mandelker, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3
(Jan. 1990); Michael M. Berger, The “Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How
the Supreme Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, INST. ON PLAN., ZONING,
& EMINENT DOMAIN (1991); Michael M. Berger, Regulatory Takings Under the Fifth
Amendment: A Constitutional Primer, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 13-19 (1994); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View From the Trenches–A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837 (1998); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2000); Michael M. Berger, Property Rights and Takings Law:
Y2K and Beyond, INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN (2002) [hereinafter Property
Rights & Takings]; Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There
from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches
the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671 (2004); Michael M. Berger, What Has San Remo
Done to the Ripeness Doctrine?, INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN (2006).
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particular property rights case then at issue. After prodding and poking, like so many highly educated fruit peddlers, the courts decided
that the cases were simply not “ripe” enough for them to deal with.
How much ink and paper could have been saved—and perhaps some
justice done in the process—if the courts had simply decided the issues in the cases before them?
As practiced in land use cases, the ripeness rule was nonsense
when first articulated2 and it remains nonsense today. One might
have been willing to cut the Supreme Court some slack in the early
days of regulatory taking litigation (i.e., the late 1970s and early
1980s, when land use taking issues began to appear in court with
some regularity), as the Court was candid about its inability to determine any bright line rules in a legal field that it had essentially abandoned for half a century (i.e., since the decision in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon).3 In the Court’s 1978 words:
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole,” this Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula”
for determining when “justice and fairness” require
that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely “upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.”4
2

Actually, it was not “first articulated” at the outset of the series of Supreme Court opinions we now categorize as dealing with “ripeness.” Rather, after ducking the substantive
issue (of what it takes to cause a regulatory taking) each time it came before the Court for
nearly a decade, it finally dawned on people that what had developed (by the repeated dismissal of cases accepted for review as not having been ready for prime time) was an ad hoc
rule for determining whether a regulatory taking case was ripe enough for litigation. See infra text accompanying notes 17-27.
3
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). There were no Supreme
Court inverse condemnation cases between then and 1978.
4
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (alteration in
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The Court was still floundering when, in 1985, it articulated
what has become the backbone of the ripeness rule in federal takings
litigation: A case is not ripe for federal court takings litigation until
the property owner has “obtained a final decision” of what use will be
permitted of the owner’s land and has exhausted (unsuccessfully) any
avenue of compensatory relief afforded under state law.5 Thus, the
Williamson County rule was born.6 It would not be until 1987, when
the Court decided the famous “trilogy” of Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, and
First English v. County of Los Angeles7 that the Court began to get a
handle on substantive regulatory takings law.8
But much has happened since 1978, and even since 1987.
The slate is no longer clean, and the Court is no longer a stranger to
takings cases. Indeed, the Court’s most recent Term showed that the
Justices now seem able to deal with some of the basic substantive issues of takings law, sometimes unanimously.9 Moreover, in 2005,
four Justices of the Supreme Court went on record as saying that the
Williamson County rule was in serious need of re-evaluation and,
perhaps, should be discarded.10 The author of that concurring opinion (Chief Justice Rehnquist) confessed that he might have been mistaken in joining the Williamson County majority.11 Three others (Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas) signed the Chief’s
concurring opinion.12 Both lower courts and scholarly commentators
original) (citations omitted).
5
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l. Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985).
6
Id.
7
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505 (1987); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
8
A contemporaneous discussion of the holdings in those seminal cases is in Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution, supra note 1, at 743-55. The author briefed and argued First English and filed an amicus curiae brief in Nollan.
9
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012); Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2056 (2013); Koontz v. St. John’s River Water
Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013); Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735
(2013).
10
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 348-52 (2005)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
11
Id. at 348-49.
12
Id. at 348. The continuing validity of Williamson County had not been raised by the
owner’s counsel. Indeed, at oral argument Justice O’Connor directly asked whether he had
challenged Williamson County. When he replied in the negative, she responded, “Maybe
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have seemed to engage in a contest to invent expletives to use in describing Williamson County.13 Unfortunately, although the Court has
had the issue of Williamson County’s continued legitimacy presented
in a number of petitions for certiorari since 2005, the Court has
granted none.14 Nor, of course, has it indicated why—following a
concurring opinion that seemed like an open invitation to the bar to
present the issue for determination15—it has chosen to remain aloof
from the fray.
I’ve said it before. Indeed, in boldly setting out a takings
agenda for the Court during the Y2K frenzy of prognostications and
hysterical warnings of impending doom, I strongly urged the Court to
“develop a clear, understandable, workable ‘ripeness’ rule. Better
yet, allow property owners to sue directly in federal court to redress
violations of federal constitutional rights.”16 It is time. For those
property owners who have lost substantial interests in property because of the ripeness game that has left them either playing the role
of shuttlecock in some jurisprudential badminton game batting them
between state and federal courts,17 or simply because they became
you should have.” Various of the supporting amicus briefs did so (including one written by
the author of this article), but the Court acted as though the legitimacy of Williamson County
was not involved, as it had not been raised by a party. Later in oral argument, in a colloquy
with the city’s lawyer, Justice O’Connor noted that “frankly, it isn’t clear to me that the
Court ever contemplated just cutting off any determination in Federal court of takings claims
in the way that it seems to work out by application of Williamson County.”
13
Berger & Kanner, Shell Game, supra note 1, at 702-03. The opprobrious descriptions
of the Williamson County rule ran a gamut from “unpleasant,” “unfortunate,” and “unclear,”
through “nonsense,” “draconian,” and “Kafkaesque.” Id. at 702-04.
14
See, e.g., Rockstead v. City of Crystal Lake, 486 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 947 (2007); McNamara v. City of Rittman, 473 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 813 (2007); Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 886 (2006); Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 415 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1004 (2006); SFW Arecibo, Ltd. v. Rodriguez, 415 F.3d 135
(1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1075 (2005).
15
The bar certainly views opinions like this—whether concurring in an opinion on the
merits, as here, or concurring in or dissenting from the denial of certiorari—as at least broad
hints from the Court (or some segment of it) about issues that ought to be presented for decision. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, What You Can Learn from Opinions Regarding the Denial of
Certiorari, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 18, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/201
3/11/what-you-can-learn-from-opinions-regarding-the-denial-of-certiorari/; Christopher M.
Mason, SCOTUS Cert Skirt Left Door Open for Cy Pres Tune-Up, LAW 360: A LEXISNEXIS
COMPANY (Nov. 8, 2013, 6:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/487709/scotus-certskirt-left-door-open-for-cy-pres-tune-up.
16
Berger, Property Rights & Takings, supra note 1, at 3.
17
See, e.g., Agri-Dade, Ltd. v. Metro. Dade Co., 605 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Agripost, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 195 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 1999); Agripost, LLC
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exhausted and gave up, it is long past time.
This much should be clear: No other constitutional claimant is
made to run a litigational gauntlet like the one established for property owners. Not one.18 Federal constitutional issues can, and should,
be litigated in federal court. While there may be reasons why individual cases are set aside, there is no rule that operates across the
board as it does in property takings cases. Nor is there a principled
reason for treating citizens who own property differently from other
citizens when all claims are that a government agency violated constitutional rights.
In recent years, there have been some hopeful signs (in addition to the inexplicably ignored concurring opinion in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Franscisco),19 primarily the recognition by
some courts that the ripeness doctrine is prudential, not jurisdictional,
so that federal courts may hear these cases if they so choose. But, (1)
that is not a mandatory rule, and in consequence, (2) it is not universally followed.
In short, it is time for the Supreme Court to act decisively to
eliminate this carbuncle on the body of the law.
II.

A QUICK SUMMARY OF THE WILLIAMSON COUNTY RULES

To make sure we are all playing on the same page, here is a
quick summary of the ripeness rules after Williamson County. The
rules have two prongs, finality and compensation. Each prong has
several branches.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Development of “Finality”

The test was not officially recognized as requiring “finality”
until after a number of its branches had sprung forth. In hindsight,
however, this appears to be what the Supreme Court was up to, and
we have—to date—recognized five different branches of the “finality” prong of the “ripeness” doctrine:

v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 525 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1151 (2009).
18
Berger & Kanner, Shell Game, supra note 1, at 676.
19
545 U.S. 323 (2005).
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Branch 1: The property owner must apply for a
specific use.20
No application for use was made in Agins v. City of Tiburon,21
one of the first modern-era takings cases to reach the Supreme
Court.22 The parties stipulated that, if an application had been made,
it would have been denied.23 Not enough for the Court. Some commentators have speculated that this was because Agins was an early
case (after a half century layoff from property cases), but later cases
demonstrate that it has taken a long time for the Court to begin to
grasp the realities of the land planning process.
Branch 2: The property owner apparently must make
more than one application (or, at least, not apply only
for the maximum use permitted under the zoning ordinance); in other words, a “meaningful application” for
use is required.24
Only one application was made in each of the cases cited in
the margin.25 There is troublesome language in MacDonald, Sommer
& Frates v. Yolo County26 about the property owner’s plans being
“exceedingly grandiose,” thus necessitating an application for some
use, presumably, less “grandiose.”27 The problem for property owners in trying to understand and work within the system is that the application in that case was precisely what the general plan and zoning
called for.28 The result is typical in California and in some other jurisdictions as well. But, does it comport with either common sense or
rational law? Even after spending prodigious sums and enormous effort to draft general (California’s word for comprehensive) plans and
zoning ordinances, planning agencies rarely approve development
20

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
22
Id. at 260.
23
Id.
24
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104-05; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S.
340, 352 n.8 (1986).
25
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 117-19; MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 347.
26
477 U.S. 340 (1986).
27
MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 353 n.9.
28
Id. at 347.
21
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proposals that seek to develop land precisely in accordance with the
applicable planning and zoning. They always demand something
less. Application of this branch of the finality ripeness rule reinforces
that predilection. The Del Monte Dunes29 litigation, that took years
to conclude and had to go all the way to the United States Supreme
Court for finality, is a paradigm.30 There, the 37.6-acre rectangular,
undeveloped parcel bordering the Pacific Ocean in Monterey had, for
many years, been planned and zoned for multi-family housing at a
density of twenty-nine units per acre.31 I’ll do the math for you: That
comes to more than 1000 homes for the property. That level of development was in keeping with the commercial and multi-family development bordering the parcel.32 The developer would certainly
have been within his rights to propose a 1000-unit condo development. But he didn’t. He sought only 344 single family detached
homes.33 And the planners turned him down because—at one-third
the density of the official plan—it was deemed too dense.34 They
told him to submit a revised plan for 264 units.35 They turned that
one down and suggested 224.36 Then 190.37 Nothing passed muster.
That’s when the courts got involved.
Here’s the planning essence: What’s the point of comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances if landowners and developers cannot rely on them as at least rough guides of what they will be allowed
to do? Planning and zoning is not cheap, it is not easy, and (at least
in California) it is not done overnight. Enabling legislation requires
intensive analysis involving housing, traffic, geology, the environment, and more, along with multiple public hearings for public input—often by planning commissions as well as governing bodies.
After all that, shouldn’t citizens be able to rely on the product?

29

526 U.S. 687 (1999).
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 693, 695
(1999).
31
Id. at 694, 695.
32
Id. at 695.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 695-96.
35
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 695-96.
36
Id. at 696.
37
Id.
30
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Branch 3: The property owner must apply for a variance.38
Although the idea of seeking a variance seems hard to dispute
in the abstract, it can cause problems in particular cases. In Williamson County itself, for example, the Court was suggesting the use of
the variance procedure (essentially a device to resolve minor size and
configuration problems) to deal with a 736 home, 676-acre subdivision in bulk.39 Some lower courts have taken the Supreme Court literally, and held that a “variance” must be sought even if one is not
legally available according to local law.40 Perhaps this was just an
early indication of the Court’s lack of understanding of the process,
and it used the word “variance” in the vernacular sense of simply asking that the rules be changed to fit the planned project.41
Branch 4: The property owner must obtain a “final” determination of what the government will permit.42
This idea obviously caused a little bit of confusion within the
Court, because the opinion contains a somewhat lengthy discussion to
the effect that the “finality” requirement is not an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, even though the concepts sound
awfully similar.43 What is supposedly needed is a “final” determination of what the regulator will allow the property owner to do on his
land.44 As any planner knows, however, that is not the job of either a

38

Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 200.
Id. at 177, 188.
40
See, e.g., Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir.
1988); Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir.
1988).
41
See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The
term ‘variance’ is not definitive or talismanic; if other types of permits or actions are available and could provide similar relief, they must be sought.”).
42
Id. at 502.
43
Id. at 503 n.4.
44
Of course, if comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances could actually be taken at face
value as showing what could be developed on specific property, then this idea of getting a
“final” decision from planners about what could be developed might make some modicum of
sense. But that is not our system. Berger & Kanner, Shell Game, supra note 1, at 676;
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
39
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municipal planning or zoning ordinance or of a professional planner.
The planner’s job is to draw an abstract plan for all or part of a municipality and then (after it is adopted by the governing body) determine whether a specific proposal meets all the requirements. Anyone
who thinks that he can get a planning agency to tell him what he
CAN do on his land has probably been abusing some controlled substance—or doesn’t understand the planning process.
Branch 5: The property owner must actually be injured by application of the regulation.45
The idea of suffering actual injury as a predicate to an action
seeking compensation is hardly new to the law.46 In Supreme Court
parlance, there would be no case or controversy.47 However, as is often the case, the devil is in the details. What, for example, constitutes
an “actual injury?” If a property owner is prevented from using land,
that non-use is certainly felt as injury by the owner. Courts, however,
have sometimes dismissed such concerns as simply the normal impact of the planning process. Or consider property owners who are
prevented from changing the use of property that has become economically unproductive. The Supreme Court’s earliest pronouncement showed little understanding:
[T]he New York City law does not interfere in any
way with the present uses of the Terminal. Its designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to use the property
precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years . . . .48
B.

The “Compensation” Prong

Branch 1: If compensation is available in state
court it must be sought before resort can be had to

45

See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-97
(1981); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).
46
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
47
Id.
48
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added).
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federal court.49
Branch 2: The property owner must seek compensation before seeking to invalidate the regulation.50
III.

THE UPSHOT IN THE LOWER COURTS

Lower courts have been understandably confused. I had one
Ninth Circuit Judge ask me during oral argument whether I did not
think it obvious that the Supreme Court did not want any regulatory
taking cases in federal court?51 I had an Eighth Circuit Judge ask
why we were bothering with his court at all, rather than simply appealing directly to the Supreme Court, which is the only court that
could resolve the mess.52
Part of the problem has been the refusal of some lower courts
to simply read the language of Williamson County, rather than trying
to read the minds of the Justices. The Court’s analytical section begins with the announced “conclu[sion] that respondent’s claim is
premature.”53 Please note that the word chosen was “premature,” not
“moribund.”54 Prematurity necessarily means that something is yet to
be done to make the matter mature, or jurisdictionally “ripe.”55 The
Williamson County opinion then goes on to say that, because of the
lack of both a final administrative decision and the absence of an attempt to seek compensation in state court, “respondent’s claim is not
ripe.”56 Please note again that the phrase chosen was “not ripe,” rather than “dead.” Absence of ripeness necessarily means that things
need to—and can—be done to make the matter ripe.57

49

Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194.
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); contra Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State, 260 Cal. Rptr. 736, 743-44 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that in California,
invalidation must be sought before compensation).
51
See Hayward Exch., Inc. v. City of Oakland, 69 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 1995).
52
See Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 2003).
53
Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 185.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 186.
56
Id.
57
See Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 1, at 102, 104-05 (discussing with
greater detail what more can be done in order to ripen the matter).
50
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THE SUPREME COURT HAS ENGENDERED BOTH HOPE AND
CONFUSION

There is good news and bad news from the Supreme Court.
We’ll start with the bad news.
A.

Procedurally, the Supreme Court has Multiplied
the Confusion

Procedural problems exist because, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court’s ripeness doctrine was not developed by the Court as a
unitary doctrine vel non. Rather, it simply grew on its own as the
Court lurched through the late 1970s and early 1980s, granting certiorari in regulatory takings cases and then concluding that it could not
(for one reason or another) reach the merits.58 Some of us believe
that it was merely a case of the Court always having four votes to
grant certiorari, but never being able to get a group of five to coalesce
around a result. Hence, the series of decisions that ducked making
decisions. What we were left with was the inadvertently developed
ripeness rule.
What scholars and practitioners alike believed we had as of
1985 (when Williamson County was decided) was a rule that required
property owners to seek relief under state law (presumably in state
court), if relief were theoretically available there, and then lose in that
attempt before darkening the doorway of a federal courthouse.59
Property owners and their advocates believed this to be an unfair rule,
but at least it was a clearly stated unfair rule.60
That regime lasted until 1997, with decision of the City of
Chicago v. International College of Surgeons case.61 That was a removal case. As a reminder of first year Civil Procedure class, when a
case is brought in state court that could have been brought in federal
court, the defendant has the right to remove the matter to federal

58

Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131; Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 199; Hodel, 452 U.S. at

304.
59

Some cases in this era were able to be filed immediately in federal court because there
was not even theoretical relief available in state court. See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S.
at 699 (stating that compensation is not available in California).
60
Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 1, at 134.
61
522 U.S. 156 (1997).
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court.62 Long story short, the City of Chicago placed historic preservation restrictions on property owned by the Surgeons.63 The Surgeons sued in state court.64 Preferring the confines of the local federal court, the City removed the case.65 The case reached the Supreme
Court on the question of whether removal was appropriate.66 The
Court held that it was, on the stunning ground that “ ‘[A] facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional . . . zoning ordinance’ is a
claim ‘which we would assuredly not require to be brought in state
courts.’ ”67
The Court evidently overlooked Williamson County, under
which any such claim brought in federal court would swiftly have
been dismissed.68 Strangely, no party who filed a brief in the College
of Surgeons case cited either Williamson County or its ripeness rule.69
Thus, the confluence of Williamson County and College of Surgeons
led to a rule that a property owner could not file suit in federal court
over a takings claim, but the defendant municipality could remove it
there.70 A one way option. Anarchy rather than law.
But all has not been bleak. There has been some more helpful
procedural commentary from the Supreme Court. In addition to the
San Remo concurrence’s suggestion that Williamson County may
have been “mistaken,” the Court has expressed the view that Williamson County ripeness is a “prudential” rule rather than a “jurisdictional” one.71 This is a critical happening. It reinforces the plain
words of Williamson County about federal litigation being premature
(rather than barred), and it allows flexibility to lower courts to consider the merits of serious cases brought before them, rather than
62

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 159-60.
64
Id. at 160.
65
Id. at 161.
66
Id. at 163.
67
Id. at 168 (alteration in original) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 372 (1989)).
68
Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194-95.
69
See Brief for Petitioner, City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997)
(No. 96-910); Brief for Respondent on the Merits, City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156 (1997) (No. 96-910).
70
Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163; Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194.
71
San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062;
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 729
(2010).
63
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spending their time on procedural web spinning of little moment.
Moreover, in response to those lower courts’ concluding that federal
claims could not be brought in state court, the lead opinion in San
Remo rejected the idea, saying that Williamson County “does not preclude state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiff’s request
for compensation under state law and the claim that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution.”72
Some lower courts are joining this trend. The Fourth Circuit
recently decided two cases in somewhat different procedural postures, but ended up allowing federal litigation to proceed. In Sansotta
v. Town of Nags Head,73 suit was filed in state court and then removed by the defendant to federal court.74 When the town then
sought dismissal from the federal court for lack of ripeness, the
Fourth Circuit concluded quite sensibly that removal constituted a
waiver of any such ripeness defense the town may once have had.75
At the same time, in Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko,76 it was the
property owner who removed the case to federal court.77 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit held that Williamson County’s rule was prudential, giving courts the discretion to litigate or not.78 In this case,
the court held that federal litigation was appropriate and ordered the
district court to consider it.79 In a recent en banc decision, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the rule was prudential and decided the merits.80 Thus, although the property owner lost, it was on the merits, not
because of the game of jurisdiction guessing.81
B.

Substantively, the Court Seems to be Gaining
Understanding of Land Use

One of the problems in the Supreme Court’s development of
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

San Remo, 545 U.S. at 346.
724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 538.
Id. at 545-46.
728 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Id.
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rules for litigating regulatory taking cases has seemed to be the
Court’s general lack of understanding of how the land use process actually works. No disrespect is intended; it is simply that the Justices
have had little or no exposure to this field of the law and their research attorneys likewise. How else can you explain Williamson
County’s bland suggestion that the “variance” concept—a specific
tool designed to deal with minor size and space adjustments—be used
to reconfigure an entire (and quite large) subdivision?82 Or MacDonald’s suggestion that a property owner’s application to develop his
land in precisely the way that the city’s general plan and zoning ordinance said that he could was somehow “exceedingly grandiose?”83
The arc of the Court’s education and understanding of the
process has proceeded from 1978 until now in a generally positive
way. The current state of that understanding may be seen in the three
decisions dealing with property rights decided from late 2012 through
mid-2013.84
The first case was actually a physical invasion case, but the
Court took the opportunity to (1) eliminate a foolish rule that had developed regarding compensation for temporary takings and (2) expressly distance itself from a “Chicken Little” argument that government agencies routinely make in all taking cases, particularly
regulatory taking cases.85 The case was Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission v. United States.86 The issue was whether the old federal
flooding rule, that flooding cannot be a taking unless it is absolutely,
positively, and irrevocably permanent, is still valid.87 The Federal
Circuit held it was valid and reversed a judgment for compensation,
holding that the situation “at most created tort liability.”88
The property taken was bottomland timber. The taking was
done by six consecutive years of flooding (protested by the owner)
during the growing season. The classic federal rule was that flooding
is not a taking if it is not permanent, no matter how many times it
82

Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 188.
MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 353 n.9.
84
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586; Horne, 133 S. Ct. 2053; Ark. Game and Fish Comm’n, 133 S.
Ct. 511; see also Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735 (dealing with admiralty jurisdiction that I view as a
taking case, however, because it involves seizure and destruction of a floating home).
85
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519.
86
133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
87
Id. at 515.
88
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
83
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happens temporarily. It was akin to the tort concept that every dog is
entitled to one “free bite” before its owner can be held liable for
damages. Not sure if that makes sense with dogs; it never made
sense to me for flood control projects.
Moreover, the law has changed. After First English, where
the Court held that the Fifth Amendment protects against temporary,
as well as permanent, takings,89 this issue should have been closed.
Since then, the Federal Circuit dealt with the concept of “permanence” (albeit in a non-flooding context) and concluded, if the action
happens for as long as the government wants it to, it is permanent —
even though the government may stop at any time.90 Furthermore,
that same court held the destruction of timber (which apparently happened six times in this case) required compensation.91
Below, the Claims Court determined that the flooding was
both substantial and predictable, and awarded $5.7 million in damages for lost trees and reclamation costs. The Federal Circuit reversed.92 Acknowledging the temporary taking rule of First English,
the Circuit decided to ignore it because “cases involving flooding and
flow-age easements are different.”93
The Supreme Court held these cases are not different and
therefore reversed.94 That resolved one problem: the idea that some
kinds of takings could be immunized if they did not happen frequently enough, a positive development.95
But perhaps the highlight of the opinion was the Court’s response to the Feds’ argument that imposing liability “would unduly
impede the government’s ability to act in the public interest.”96 That
canard has been raised in numerous taking cases — particularly regulatory cases — with numerous governmental amici (from agencies at
levels ranging from the United States Solicitor General to local mosquito abatement districts). The answer: “[t]ime and again in Takings
89

First English, 482 U.S. at 318-19.
Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
91
Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762, 763-64 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
92
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 637 F.3d at 1379.
93
Id. at 1374 (relying on pre-First English decisions).
94
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519, 523.
95
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(demonstrating that on remand, the Federal Circuit got the message and ruled in favor of the
property owner).
96
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 521.
90
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Clause cases” the government has raised this issue; “[t]he sky did not
fall” after the argument was rejected before.97
This decision was unanimous.
Next, the Court dealt with administrative overreaching by the
Department of Agriculture.98 Everyone knows those dancing California raisins. What you may not know is (1) almost all American
raisins come from California, and (2) the Feds have a Depression-era
scheme to prop up raisin prices by requiring all raisin handlers to donate a substantial portion of their product to the Feds for use in
school lunch programs, etc.99 There is supposed to be some payment
for those raisins, but not enough to satisfy all the raisin folks. Mr.
and Mrs. Horne got tired of it and refused to comply.100 They tired of
the game in 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, when the Feds required them
to “donate” 47% and 30% of their crop to the “reserve” pool, for
which they would not be paid.101 They voiced their position to the
Secretary of Agriculture:
[W]e are growers that will pack and market our raisins. We reserve our rights under the Constitution of
the United States . . . [T]he Marketing Order Regulating Raisins has become a tool for grower bankruptcy,
poverty, and involuntary servitude.[102] The Marketing
Order Regulating Raisins is a complete failure for
growers, handlers, and the USDA . . . [W]e will not
relinquish ownership of our crop. We put forth the
money and effort to grow it, not the Raisin Administrative Committee. This is America, not a communist
state.103
The Government then brought an enforcement action against
them — for the value of their own raisins that they did not turn over
($483,843.53) — plus a hefty fine ($202,600), plus interest.104 The
97

Id.
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2056.
99
Id. at 2056-58 (explaining the difference between “growers” and “handlers” is so arcane
that counsel could not always keep it straight).
100
Id. at 2059.
101
Id. at 2057 n.2, 2059.
102
Apparently, this Thirteenth Amendment issue did not make it into the complaint.
103
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2058 n.3 (alteration in original).
104
Id. at 2059.
98
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Hornes’ defense was that the Feds had taken their private property for
public use without compensation.105 It seems that in all the years
since this statute was enacted, no one had thought to do that. The
Hornes had initially argued that the Fifth Amendment violation consisted of the Government’s confiscating their raisins.106 However,
when the Government’s enforcement action was filed, that changed
to a claim that they could not be compelled to pay fines for refusing
to accede to an unconstitutional taking of their raisins.107
The definitive question turned out to be whether the Hornes
could raise the Fifth Amendment as a defense to the Federal Government’s action or, instead, whether they had to pay the money and
then sue in the Court of Federal Claims to get it back. 108 The Government’s overreaching position was the latter.109
The District Court ruled in favor of the Government.110 The
Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, holding that the farmers could have
avoided the confiscatory program by simply not entering the raisin
market.111 Because they voluntarily chose to sell their raisins, they
accepted the consequences. (The District Court concluded that “[t]he
Government does not force plaintiffs to grow raisins or to market the
raisins” and mildly called donating nearly half the crop “an admissions fee or toll — admittedly a steep one — for marketing raisins.”)112 After the Hornes petitioned for rehearing, the Government,
for the first time, urged that the takings defense was not ripe because
it should have been brought in the Court of Federal Claims.113 In an
amended opinion, the Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the exclusive
forum for takings claims is the Claims Court.114 Certiorari was granted to determine whether the Takings Clause could be raised as a defense to enjoin a direct transfer of funds mandated by the government

105

Id.
Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., No. CV-F-08-1549, 2009 WL 4895362, *5
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009).
107
Id. at *6.
108
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2063.
109
Id. at 2061.
110
Id. at 2059.
111
Id. at 2060.
112
Id.
113
Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 673 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012).
114
Id. at 1080.
106
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and whether the federal district court would have jurisdiction.115
In its decision, the Court distinguished Williamson County in
ways that may prove useful in other takings cases.116 (1) The Hornes
plainly satisfied the requirement of obtaining a “final decision” from
the agency: the agency imposed concrete fines.117 The ease with
which the Court reached this conclusion was interesting, as four Justices had concluded in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel118 that a mere
monetary demand (there, the funding of health benefits for the families of former coal miners) should not activate the Takings Clause.119
(2) The possibility of using alternative judicial procedures (state
courts in Williamson County and the CFC here) was not a barrier, as
the raisin marketing statute preempted the CFC.120
What may elevate this opinion above the realm of raisin marketing orders is the Court’s general conclusion that the regulated entity did not have to first pay the fine before being allowed to challenge
it in court.121 The ability to demand payment — here, some $700,000
— as a condition to entry into a federal courthouse gives the Government a giant leg up. How many people are able to pay that price
of admission? As the Court put it, however:
In the case of an administrative enforcement proceeding, when a party raises a constitutional defense to an
assessed fine, it would make little sense to require the
party to pay the fine in one proceeding and then turn
around and sue for recovery of that same money in
another proceeding.122
More than just raisin growers face this kind of hurdle.
This decision was also unanimous.
Just before it recessed for the summer, the Court decided what
may have been the most important of the decisions, Koontz.123 We all
know Nollan and Dolan, and their rules about confiscatory conditions
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2060-61.
Id. at 2061-62.
Id.
524 U.S. 498 (1998).
Id. at 503-04, 521.
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
Id. at 2063.
Id.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586.
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placed on the issuance of land use permits.124 But what if the regulator proposes conditions and the owner rejects them and the permit is
then denied? Do the Nollan/Dolan rules apply? Does it matter that
the proposed conditions would have required work or money to be
spent on irrelevant and distant land?
The trial court found a taking.125 The District then changed its
mind and issued the permits.126 Compensation of some $376,000 was
awarded for a temporary taking.127 The Florida District Court affirmed,128 but the Florida Supreme Court reversed.129 It held that the
Nollan/Dolan rules do not apply (1) to money or (2) to the denial of a
permit.130
The United States Supreme Court reversed on both issues.131
The vote was 5-4 but, as to the latter point, the Court was unanimous.132 All of the Justices recognized the word game that the government was playing and would have none of it.133 Indeed, probably
the most refreshing thing about the majority opinion was several clear
statements indicating that the Court (and, remember, this part of the
opinion was unanimous) seemed to finally understand what actually
occurs during municipal land use permit hearings: Four times —
count ‘em, four (five, if you count the one quote from Nollan) — the
Court used the word “extortionate” to describe the imposition of conditions.134 Elsewhere, the Court also seemed to grasp the unfair attempts that municipalities make to leverage their power:
[L]and use permit applicants are especially vulnerable
to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often
has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far
124
See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825
(1987).
125
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
126
St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(Griffin, J., dissenting).
127
Id.
128
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 2593-94.
131
Id. at 2603.
132
Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
133
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
134
Id. at 2595-97, 2603 (majority opinion).
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more than [the] property it would like to take. . . . So
long as the building permit is more valuable than any
just compensation the owner could hope to receive for
the right-of-way, the owner is likely to accede to the
government’s demand, no matter how unreasonable.135
If there were nothing more, this would have been significant
progress. But there is, of course, more.
The facts were not unusual. Koontz owned a bit less than fifteen acres of land and wanted to develop 3.7 acres.136 As it was
largely wetlands (it was in Florida, after all), he offered to place a
conservation easement over the remainder of the property.137 The
agency wanted more.138 It offered Koontz two options: (1) he could
reduce his project to one acre and put the easement over all the remaining property; or (2) he could pay for work done on agency property located several miles away and having nothing to do with his
proposed project.139 Koontz declined, and the agency denied the
permit.140
When the dust settled in Florida, the state Supreme Court had
issued an opinion that would have hamstrung takings litigation in
general and exaction litigation in particular.
The United States Supreme Court split down traditional ideological lines, with Justice Alito writing for the majority and Justice
Kagan for the dissenters.141 The majority made quick work of Florida’s “maneuver [that] effectively interred” Nollan and Dolan.142 As
noted, even the dissenters agreed on this point: whether the conditions are attached before the permit is issued, or held over the developer’s head until afterward, makes no difference.143 Conditions,
whether precedent or subsequent, are treated the same for this purpose.
The upshot of these recent decisions is that the Supreme Court

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 2594-95.
Id. at 2591-92.
Id. at 2592-93.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2591, 2603.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591.
Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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seems finally to be gaining an understanding of how the land use process works, how regulators have been using their position to leverage
their bargaining strength, and how a number of time-honored government arguments can no longer be credited.
That brings us full circle. If, as I strongly suspect, much of
the ripeness problem came about because the Supreme Court simply
did not understand the land use system and took the government’s
word for how it operates, then the last several decades of hearing
these cases has provided an eye-opening education. Armed with
knowledge, the Supreme Court is now in a position to tackle Williamson County head on and bring some sanity to this legal field.
V.

CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The Supreme Court has some work to do. Although it is nice
to see that some circuit courts now recognize that Williamson County
established merely a prudential rule, other circuits insist that such
prudence be exercised in favor of yielding jurisdiction to state courts
and keeping their federal hands off these cases.144 That leads to a
mishmash of law, applying what should be a uniform standard of
conduct under the federal constitution. Until the Supreme Court
steps in, there will be no uniformity.
The rest of us, of course, will never know why the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in the growing number of petitions that have
raised the Williamson County issue. It is unfortunate that two of the
four Justices openly skeptical of Williamson County in the San Remo
litigation are no longer on the Court. It may be that the remaining
two Justices have not been able to garner sufficient support among
the newer members of the Court to take another case. That would be
a shame.
In the end, the procedural mess that exists in regulatory taking
cases can wholly be laid at the doorstep of the Supreme Court. If you
go back and read the Circuit Court opinion in Williamson County,
you will find a perfectly rational determination of a regulatory taking
case that was tried on its merits and fully adjudicated. For some reason, the Supreme Court decided to place some restrictions on bringing such cases in federal court. As the concurring San Remo Justices
observed, however, there had developed a catalogue of shortcomings
144

Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545; Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1117.
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noted by lower courts and legal commentators, challenging the core
Williamson County precept that the Constitution somehow requires
state court litigation.145 That, said the four Justices, is “not clear,”
“not obvious,” and “[not] support[ed]” by the cases relied on there.146
But, there is only one court that can clean up this mess, and
that is the Supreme Court. I have always been an optimist (one cannot represent property owners in this field without being an optimist),
but I have not been able to get the Court’s attention either with the articles noted in the early footnote, or with petitions for certiorari asking for rational resolution of this package of issues.
I will continue to be an optimist. The fact that the Court
could actually deal with the merits of multiple takings cases in its
most recent Term gives me hope that it can finally cut through the
mare’s nest that ripeness has become. Stay tuned. This ain’t over
yet.

145
146

San Remo, 545 U.S. at 349-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 349 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/7

22

